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Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In 
Search of a Defense 
MARK N. BERRY' 
A controversial issue facing U.S. antitrust law is whether horizontal 
mergers involving market power should be permitted on the basis 
of efficiency claims. Historically, the notion of an efficiencies 
defense has met with judicial hostility, but attitudes are changing. 
This Article critically analyzes the developments and argues the 
case for the emergence of an absolute judicial formulation of the 
defense and wider enforcement discretion. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most complex and uncertain questions facing U.S. antitrust 
law today is how to account for efficiency claims in the case of 
horizontal mergers involving market power. Notwithstanding the 
rhetoric of merger, and the inevitable claims about efficiency motivation, 
studies have concluded that a significant number of mergers do not 
achieve their efficiency expectations. 1 However, it is recognized that 
* Mark Berry is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, University of Otago, 
New Zealand. This Article has been written in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. 
The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments from Professor Harvey J. 
Goldschmid, Professor Victor P. Goldberg, and Professor Robert Pitofsky in relation to 
earlier drafts of this article. 
l. See, e.g., DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, 
AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987). While this study concentrated upon the conglomer-
ate merger wave of the 1960s and surrounding years, it also included data of horizontal 
acquisitions. Id. at 56-122. 
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some horizontal mergers may involve significant economies of scale in 
production2 and other efficiencies. 3 Accordingly, it is appropriate that 
the potential for an efficiencies defense should be on the agenda, but the 
trends just described also suggest that it is an issue which should be 
approached with caution. 
The defense has an uncertain past. When Congress enacted the 
antitrust laws impacting on mergers, it had no appreciation of the 
potential for horizontal mergers to involve both market power and 
efficiencies. Rather, Congress was preoccupied with the unfair transfer 
of consumers' wealth and a range of "populist" goals.4 Against this 
background it is not surprising that there has been judicial hostility to 
the concept of an efficiencies defense. But the level of hostility, in 
particular the hostility of the Supreme Court in the 1960s, has begun to 
subside.5 
The defense has benefited from greater knowledge. Professor Oliver 
E. Williamson first advanced the notion of an efficiencies defense in 
1968 as an exception to the restrictive rule which had emerged in the 
Supreme Court's opinions.6 However, progress on the adoption of the 
defense since 1968 has been slow. This is not surprising. The 
scholarship on the defense since Williamson's seminal work has 
demonstrated its complexity and uncertainty. The defense has been 
raised only in a small number of cases and in circumstances where the 
courts have not been required to decide the matter. Nonetheless, there 
2. This proposition is not without qualification. In the short run there is the 
rationalization problem of plants which are already built and this obviously impacts on 
the ability to achieve plant-specific economies of scale. Plant closure may in some cases 
be possible, with the most efficient units being retained or expanded. ff there is no 
immediate plant closure or expansion, the merger may still yield scale economies in the 
longer term. Companies with older plants are more likely to invest in large-scale 
replacement and companies with increased market share are also better suited to invest 
in sizeable new plants. For further discussion of these qualifications see F. M. SCHERER 
& DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 163-
64 (3d ed. 1990). 
3. For example, product-specific economies of scale, advantages in marketing, the 
infusion of superior management, and advantages in capital-raising. For an economic 
critique of these claims see id. at 164-67. 
4. See infra part II.B. 
5. See infra part 11.C. 
6. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeojfs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. I 8 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Economies/Welfare 
Tradeojfs]. Williamson developed his arguments for the defense in four further articles. 
See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Correction and Reply, 
58 AM. ECON. REV. 1372 (1968); Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the 
Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 105 (1969); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 
(1977) [hereinafter Williamson, Defense Revisited]. 
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has been an appreciable shift in judicial attitudes and many of these 
cases have at least commented favorably on efficiency considerations. 
Notwithstanding recent claims that the international competitiveness 
of American firms will be threatened if some form of efficiencies 
defense is not adopted,7 the progress of the defense will inevitably be 
conditioned by the normal decision-making process. It may not be 
difficult for the courts to continue to comment favorably on efficiencies 
in future cases. But, judicial acceptance of the defense will involve a 
bold move, a move which few judges may be confident enough to make. 
The defense has questionable theoretical foundations and there are 
significant problems involved in the formulation of a workable test. 8 
This Article will outline the central issues which require consideration 
if the efficiencies defense is to emerge. The scheme of this Article will 
be to consider: 
(1) Whether the legislative history and judicial treatment of the 
efficiencies defense precludes its emergence; 
(2) how certain theoretical foundations (such as the goals of antitrust, 
the comparative forms of efficiency, and economic models) may 
impact on the emergence and formulation of the defense; 
(3) whether the defense should be based upon a net efficiencies or 
absolute test; 
7. See Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger E,iforcement 
in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 198, 213-15 (1992). While many U.S. 
corporations may view an expanded domestic production base as being critical to their 
international competitiveness, such justification for the efficiencies defense may be 
overstated. For example, it may be argued that concerns about international competitive-
ness can be accommodated by defining markets to be international in appropriate cases. 
Admittedly, the definition of international markets raises complex issues, but if such an 
approach is adopted it has the potential to impact dramatically on market power 
assessments. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 963 (1981); see also George Hay et al., 
Geographic Market Definition in an International Context, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 71 I, 
729-34 (I 988); cf Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: 
An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REv. l, 57-59, 62-64 (1984) (emphasizing the 
uncertainties surrounding the ability of firms to divert the potential supply of exported 
goods back to the relevant market, and of foreign firms to increase supplies into the 
market). Alternately, from an economics perspective, it can be argued that the adoption 
of domestic terms of reference may be appropriate because active domestic rivalry is 
strongly associated with international success. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 644 (1990). 
8. See infra parts III and IV. 
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(4) whether the defense should be rejected because of measurement 
ambiguities; 
(5) whether the defense should set a distributional standard requiring 
that the cost savings be passed on to consumeiS; and 
(6) whether the defense should be available if the claimed efficiencies 
can be achieved by other means, such as internal expansion or joint 
ventures. 
A final section will consider how enforcement discretion may accommo-
date the notion of an efficiencies defense, even if it does not receive 
judicial recognition. 
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES 
A. Horizontal Mergers Generally 
It is appropriate to commence with a brief outline of the current 
analysis of horizontal mergers in the United States, because it is within 
this framework that the efficiencies defense must be considered. The 
prevailing legislation which governs mergers is section 7 of the Clayton 
Act,9 which prohibits mergers where the result may be to lessen 
competition substantially or to tend to create a monopoly. 10 The 
current approach to the application of section 7 reveals a preoccupation 
with governmental guidelines11 rather than case law developments. 
This is due in large part to the fact that while the Supreme Court has 
initiated certain analytical trends, it has not had the opportunity to refine 
these since the mid-1970s. 12 Rather, the trend over recent years has 
been to negotiate settlements with the enforcement agencies during the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino process. 13 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1973). 
I 0. Other legislative provisions which have the potential to apply to horizontal 
mergers are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1973) (which prohibits every contract, 
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce), and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973) (which prohibits unfair methods of competi-
tion). These provisions have potentially broader coverage than § 7 of the Clayton Act. 
The question of the efficiencies defense is likely to involve the same considerations 
under each of these legislative provisions as is the case under § 7. 
11. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 ( 1992) [hereinafter Merger 
Guidelines]. 
12. For a recent discussion of the case law developments relating to the analysis 
of horizontal mergers, see STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 318-54 
(1992). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 441-500 (1994). 
13. For a discussion of Hart-Scott-Rodino procedures see I STEPHEN M. AXINN 
ET AL, ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS 
ACT (rev. ed. 1995). 
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Two significant trends have emerged from the Supreme Court 
opinions. First, there is the rule of presumptive illegality which is based 
upon concentration and market shares. This development of the Warren 
Court in the 1960s was given its clearest expression in United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank. 14 Second, in United States v. General 
Dynamics Corp., 15 the only substantive horizontal merger case decided 
by the Supreme Court since the Warren Court judgments, the majority 
accepted this approach, but added a further step to the process. The rule 
of presumptive illegality was made subject to "the absence of other 
considerations. "16 
The Merger Guidelines have developed an approach which is generally 
consistent with these trends, 17 but there is an increased sophistication 
to the analysis. On the basis of the Merger Guidelines, horizontal 
mergers are likely to be viewed as presumptively unlawful where the 
merged firm will achieve a fifteen to sixteen percent market share. This 
threshold may be lowered in cases where concentration in the relevant 
market is high. Conversely, where concentration is low, a combined 
market share in excess of sixteen percent may not be challenged. 
Additionally, if one of the merging firms has less than a two percent 
14. 374 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1963). The connection between a few number of firms 
and the exercise of market power has been a matter of debate in the economics 
literature. The various studies have demonstrated that it is difficult to develop rules of 
universal application which establish a connection between concentration and market 
power. Early studies suggested that concentrated markets are more likely to exhibit 
features of market power, such as increases in price and reduction of output. However, 
more recent studies have argued that industry structures are dictated to a large extent by 
the degree to which scale economies prevail or by the comparative efficiencies of firms. 
For a discussion of the early oligopoly theories see Leonard W. Weiss, The Concentra-
tion-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW 
LEARNING 184, 188-93 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., I 974). For a critical review 
of these theories and wider discussion on the theories of oligopoly pricing see Harold 
Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE 
NEW LEARNING, supra, at 164-84. See also SCHERER & Ross, supra note 2, at 199-233. 
15. 415 u. s. 486 (1974). 
I 6. Id. at 497-98. 
17. It has been suggested that the Merger Guidelines have one area of major 
divergence from case law trends insofar as concentration is not a factor. Trends toward 
industry concentration are of potential concern because a series of mergers, or indeed an 
isolated merger, can transform a market to a situation where oligopoly takes control. See 
Ross, supra note 12, at 334. 
519 
market share, then combinations up to thirty percent may be permit-
ted.18 
This presumption is rebuttable. 19 For example, the presumption may 
be rebutted when dominant firm behavior and coordinated interaction is 
unlikely to result2° and where new entry to the market is easy.21 
Market factors pertaining to both efficiencies22 and failure23 can also 
be taken into account under the Merger Guidelines. While the failing 
company defense has received judicial recognition,24 the position 
relating to efficiencies is unsettled. 
B. Legislative Treatment of Efficiencies 
The language of section 7 of the Clayton Act is silent on the question 
of efficiencies. Whether a judge-made efficiencies defense is available 
under section 7 will depend on whether Congress precluded its 
application or considered efficiencies to be an adverse consequence of 
mergers. This question necessitates an inquiry primarily into the 
legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to section 
7.25 
Several attempts have been made to retrace the chronology of events 
leading up to these amendments, with particular reference to the 
efficiencies defense. It appears to be common ground that the predomi-
nant concern in enacting these provisions related to the fear of concen-
tration and the transfer of wealth from consumers to monopolists.26 It 
also appears to be common ground that these amendments had various 
I 8. Market share under the Merger Guidelines is measured according to the 
Herfindahl-Herschmann Index (HHI). The HHI is calculated by summing the squares 
of the market shares of each firm in the market. If a post-merger HHI is above 1800, 
the market will be regarded as highly concentrated. If the merger produces an increase 
in the HHI of more than fifty points in such a market, it will be presumed to create or 
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise. Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, 
§ 1.5l{c); see also Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 200-01. 
19. Merger Guidelines, supra note II,§ 1.5l(c). 
20. Id. § 2. 
21. Id. § 3. 
22. Id. § 4. 
23. Id. § 5. 
24. For recent discussions of the evolution and elements of the failing company 
defense see Timothy B. Walthall, The Failing Company Defense and Corporate 
Collapse: Probing for a Rational Approach to Business Failure, 5 GEO. MASON U. L. 
REV. 51 (1982); see also Richard D. Friedman, Untangling the Failing Company 
Doctrine, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1986). 
25. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1973). 
26. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 395-97 (1980); Alan A. Fisher & Robert 
H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 7 I CAL. L. REV. 1580, 
1588-93 (1983). 
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secondary goals, such as providing opportunities for small businesses 
and encouraging corporate expansion through internal growth rather than 
through merger activity.27 
Efficiency was not a significant theme in the Congressional consider-
ation of section 7. There was limited reference to efficiency consider-
ations in the Congressional debates. Such matters as the potential for 
the merger of small firms and the acquisition of failing companies 
received ambiguous, but nonetheless favorable, comment to the extent 
that they would enhance efficiency.28 
Significantly, Congress did not directly address the situation of a 
merger which involved both concentration concerns as well as significant 
efficiencies. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that there have been 
different interpretations of the legislative history relating to efficiencies. 
Some have suggested that the concern about concentration is of such 
magnitude as to prohibit mergers, regardless of their efficiency 
characteristics.29 But, it has also been strongly argued that a close 
reading of the legislative history supports the conclusion that the new 
law was not intended to preclude an efficiencies defense.Jo The 
predominant view is that neither the language nor the legislative history 
of section 7 precludes the application of an efficiencies defense.JI 
However, the preoccupation of Congress with concerns other than 
efficiency will materially impact the manner in which any efficiencies 
defense may be formulated, as will be discussed later.J2 
C. Judicial Treatment of Efficiencies 
Three Supreme Court opinions dating back to the 1960s have been 
viewed by some to preclude an efficiencies defense. Arguably these 
decisions render the achievement of efficiencies an adverse factor in 
27. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1588-93. 
28. See Muris, supra note 26, at 399-400. 
29. See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law 
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 318 (1960). 
30. See MUR!S, supra note 26, at 396. 
31. See, e.g., 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANAL YSlS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 151-54 (I 980); Muris, 
supra note 26, at 402; C. Paul Rogers, The Limited Case for an Efficiency Defense in 
Horizontal Mergers, 58 TUL. L. REv. 503, 507-10 (1983); Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 211-
13. 
32. See infra part III. 
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assessing the legality of mergers. In more recent times, however, lower 
courts have both rejected and supported the notion of an efficiencies 
defense. 
The first of the Supreme Court's opinions was Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States.33 This case involved a challenge by the government of 
a merger between Brown Shoe Company and G. R. Kinney Company. 
Both of these companies were manufacturers and retailers of shoes. The 
essential concern raised in this case was one of vertical integration and 
the foreclosure of competition,34 but the Court also purported to 
analyze the horizontal aspects of the merger. 35 
Significantly, Brown Shoe Company did not raise efficiencies 
considerations as a justification to this merger. Indeed, in an effort to 
overcome the concerns of the District Court that the merged firm would 
enjoy advantages that would enable it to lower prices,36 Brown Shoe 
Company argued that vertical integration produced no economic 
advantages.37 This background may, to some extent, explain the 
confused analysis of the Supreme Court on efficiencies issues. Chief 
Justice Warren stated: 
A third significant aspect of this merger is that it creates a large national chain 
which is integrated with a manufacturing operation. The retail outlets of 
integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers and by increasing the volume 
of purchases from the manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their 
own brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers. Of 
course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial 
to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that 
small independent stores may be adversely affected. It is competition, not 
competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' 
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally 
owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices 
might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It 
resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization. 38 
This passage does not, as has been suggested, represent a definitive 
rejection of the efficiencies defense. Indeed, not only does it fail to 
directly address the issue of the defense, but it is also, for the most part, 
internally inconsistent. First, it suggests that efficiencies generated by 
vertically integrated enterprises should be prohibited where such 
enterprises can sell at prices below those of independent retailers. But 
33. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
34. Id. at 323-34. 
35. Id. at 334-46. 
36. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), 
ajf'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
37. See Muris, supra note 26, at 404. 
38. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 344 (I 962). 
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it then suggests that such a result would be beneficial to consumers. 
Secondly, it is contradictory to state that the focus of the legislation is 
on "competition, not competitors," and that Congress opted "in favor of 
decentralization." 
Thus, it is doubtful that Brown Shoe rejects the possibility of an 
efficiencies defense. Indeed, there are arguments to the contrary. At the 
conclusion of its section on vertical mergers the Court implied that the 
merger may be saved if it produced "any countervailing competitive, 
economic, or social advantages,"39 and, in concluding remarks in its 
consideration of horizontal merger issues, the Court again implied that 
"no mitigating factors" had been presented in support of the merger.40 
These statements at least leave open the inference that efficiency 
considerations should be taken into account. 
The subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank41 has the potential to pose a more signifi-
cant threat to the evolution of an efficiencies defense. This case 
concerned a challenge by the government to the proposed merger of 
Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust Com Exchange Bank, the 
second and third largest commercial banks headquartered in the 
Philadelphia metropolitan area. Having concluded that the consolidated 
bank would control an undue percentage share of the relevant market 
and that the consolidation would result in a significant increase in 
concentration, such that competition would be inherently likely to be 
substantially lessened, the Court turned to consider "three affirmative 
justifications" advanced by the appellees.42 One of these adjudications 
has been viewed as a rejection of the efficiencies defense. Specifically, 
Justice Brennan stated: 
This brings us to appellees' final contention, that Philadelphia needs a bank 
larger than it now has in order to bring business to the area and stimulate its 
economic development. We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of 
which "may be substantially to lessen competition" is not saved because, on 
some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be 
deemed beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary 
limits of judicial competence, and in any event has been made for us already, 
39. Id. at 334. 
40. Id. at 346. One possible interpretation of this latter statement, however, is that 
such mitigating factors may be limited to business failure, inadequate resources, or the 
need for small companies to combine to enter into more meaningful competition. 
41. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
42. Id. at 370. 
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by Congress when it enacted the amended [section] 7. Congress detennined to 
preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed 
anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we 
must assume, that some price might have to be paid.43 
Closer analysis of the subject matter of this passage, however, reveals 
that it should not be viewed as a condemnation of the efficiencies 
defense. Philadelphia National Bank was arguing that if it was bigger 
it would attract more customers into the region. This is different than 
an argument that there would be efficiencies which would benefit 
competition. Further, Justice Brennan had earlier noted that the 
appellees' arguments about the achievement of economies of scale had 
not been mentioned by the District Court and were considered aban-
doned in these proceedings.44 Thus, in Philadelphia National Bank the 
Court was not being asked to balance efficiencies against market power. 
Rather, it was being asked to consider whether benefits to a community, 
what the Court referred to as "social or economic debits and credits," 
might justify an otherwise illegal merger. 
The final case in the Supreme Court trilogy is FTC v. Procter & 
Gamble.45 In this case, the Federal Trade Commission challenged the 
acquisition of Clorox Chemical Company, the nation's largest manufac-
turer of liquid household bleach, by Procter & Gamble Company, the 
largest producer of soaps, detergents, and related products. The Court 
characterized this acquisition as a "product-extension merger."46 The 
arguments raised by the Commission in this case were essentially 
concerns about the competitive advantages that the merged entity would 
be able to achieve. The Court accepted that advertising and sales 
promotion for the products of both merging firms was vital,47 and noted 
with concern "that the merger would facilitate advertising economies."48 
It concluded that the merger had anticompetitive effects for two reasons. 
First, it substantially reduced the competitive structure of the industry by 
raising entry barriers and by dissuading smaller firms without compara-
ble marketing power from engaging in aggressive rivalry. Second, it 
eliminated the acquiring firm as a potential competitor. 49 
Of particular relevance to the efficiencies defense, Justice Douglas 
stated, "Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. 
Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may 
43. Id. at 371 (citation omitted). 
44. Id. at 334 n.10. 
45. 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
46. Id. at 570. 
47. Id. at 573. 
48. Id. at 57 4. 
49. Id. at 578. 
524 
[VOL. 33: 515, 1996] Search of a Defense 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting 
competition."50 
The Brown Shoe opinion was cited as authority for this proposition. 
On a first reading, this passage appears to negate the possibility of an 
efficiencies defense. However, more detailed consideration raises 
questions about the weight that can be attached to this statement. The 
Court's reliance on Brown Shoe and the legislative history of the 
amendments to section 7 do not, as discussed earlier, provide a clear 
basis for the proposition advanced in Procter & Gamble. Further, the 
issue of a general efficiencies defense was not in fact placed before the 
Court. The scope of the purported prohibition of the efficiencies defense 
is also ambiguous and analytically incomplete. For example, does the 
fact that "possible economies" are excluded from consideration, mean 
that more clearly identifiable economies must also be excluded? 
Additionally, the prohibition in Procter & Gamble focuses only upon 
mergers involving a lessening of competition and fails to contemplate the 
situation where the economies may enhance competition.51 
Clearly these three Supreme Court opinions reflect a bias against the 
evolution of the efficiencies defense. However, for the reasons stated 
above, it would be wrong to conclude that the Supreme Court has 
expressly rejected the defense. Several other Supreme Court opinions 
have, in fact, suggested that efficiencies should be taken into consider-
ation in the general analysis of antitrust, and in relation to section 7 
cases in particular. In Northern Pacific Railway v. United States52 the 
Court identified economic efficiency as one of the principal goals of 
antitrust,53 and in United States v. Gypsum Co. 54 economic efficiency 
was characterized as being procompetitive.55 The Court, in Aspen 
50. Id. at 580. 
51. In considering the weight to be attached to the majority opinion in Procter & 
Gamble, it is also interesting to note Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. At the outset, 
he suggested that the state of economic knowledge at that time may have been 
insufficient "to enable a sure-footed administrative or judicial determination to be made 
a priori of substantial anticompetitive effect[s] in mergers of this kind." Id. at 599. 
Justice Harlan further accepted that "economies could be used to defend a merger." Id. 
at 603. Justice Harlan did not apply his analytical framework in the present case 
because Procter & Gamble failed to present any true efficiencies. Id. at 604. 
52. 356 U.S. I (I 958). 
53. Id. at 4. 
54. 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
55. Id. at 441 n.16. 
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Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,56 also accepted that 
monopoly conduct challenged as being exclusionary, anticompetitive, or 
predatory may be justified on the basis of an efficiency explanation.57 
Finally, the exclusion of an efficiencies defense would also be contrary 
to the Court's stated desire in its last significant word on section 7 to 
consider economic evidence in assessing the legality of mergers.58 
The continuing judicial uncertainty surrounding the efficiencies 
defense is reflected in the more recent decisions of lower courts. While 
these cases have not sanctioned any mergers and are divided in their 
views on the defense, the relevance of efficiencies and the possibility of 
an efficiencies defense has nonetheless received surprisingly favorable 
treatment given the Supreme Court's apparent bias against the defense. 
The circumstances in which efficiencies have received affirmative 
comment fall into several categories. First, there is the situation where 
the government may seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary 
injunction against a proposed merger. Section 13(b) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act conditions the issuance of any such order or 
injunction to circumstances where "weighing the equities and considering 
the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be 
in the public interest."59 In weighing equities, the courts, on a number 
of occasions, have taken into account various claims of procompetitive 
efficiencies.60 In so doing, Justice (then Judge) Ginsburg expressly 
recognized in Weyerhaeuser that "it is permissible for the court to weigh 
among 'the equities' the potential benefits, public and private, that may 
be lost by a merger-blocking preliminary injunction, whether or not 
those benefits could be asserted defensively in a proceeding for 
permanent relief."61 A second, and analytically analogous, situation in 
which efficiencies have received favorable consideration is where the 
government may enter into consent decrees under which divestiture is 
agreed upon to restore competitive conditions. One factor which the 
courts are required to consider under section 2 of the Tunney Act62 
56. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
57. Id. at 605-11. See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 
504 U.S. 451, 482-83 (1992). 
58. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498-504 (1974); 
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 623-42 (1974). 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1973). 
60. See FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1981); FTC v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 52-53 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated as moot, 850 F.2d 
(D.C. Cir. 1988); FTC v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., I 986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'If 
67,071, 62,518 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1986); FTC v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 528 F. 
Supp. 84, 94 (N.D. Ill. I 98 I). 
61. Weyerhaeuser, 665 F.2d at 1083. 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(t) (1994). 
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before entering into any consent judgment is whether such judgment is 
in the "public interest." It has been accepted that efficiency consider-
ations, such as cost savings, which will enable the merged company to 
compete more effectively, may be a public interest factor. 63 While 
none of these cases relating to restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, 
and consent decrees is directly supportive of the efficiencies defense, 
they at least reflect favorably upon efficiency considerations as equity 
and public interest factors. 
The final category of recent cases which have commented favorably 
on efficiencies are those which have been directly concerned with the 
legality of mergers. These cases have addressed the question of 
efficiencies, but have not been required to decide upon the legality of the 
efficiencies defense because the mergers in question have either been 
found to be legal,64 or have not involved any convincing claim of 
efficiencies.65 The views expressed in these cases relating to efficiency 
considerations are largely of a general nature. They suggest that 
efficiencies should be regarded as factors to be considered in assessing 
postmerger competition. There has been only one case which has 
expressly advanced the possibility of a defense, namely the judgment of 
the Eleventh Circuit in University Health where Chief Judge Tjofiat 
stated, "We conclude that in certain circumstances, a defendant may 
rebut the government's prima facie case with evidence showing that the 
intended merger would create significant efficiencies in the relevant 
63. See United States v. LTV Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ,J 66,133, 66,343 
(D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1984). 
64. See United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 (D. 
Minn. 1990) ( efficiencies were relevant as a further factor to demonstrate that the merger 
would enhance competition); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 
849 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff'd mem., 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (the merger of two 
hospitals would result in more efficient operations which would be able to compete more 
effectively in terms of both price and quality of service). 
65. See FTC v. University Health, Inc. 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (I Ith Cir. 1991) 
(appellees failed to introduce sufficient evidence of efficiencies to rebut the government's 
prima facie case); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D. 
Del. 1991) ( efficiency claims were insufficient to offset the anticompetitive effects of the 
merger, with the Court being guided in this finding, in part, by "the reality that even if 
the merger resulted in efficiency gains, there are no guarantees that these savings would 
be passed on to the consuming public"); American Medical Int'!, Inc., I 04 F.T.C. I, 219-
20 (I 984) (noted that efficiencies should be taken into account in antitrust analysis in 
general and, in particular, under section 7, but concluded on the facts that there was no 
establishment, with any certainty, that substantial efficiencies existed), modified, I 04 
F.T.C. 617 (1984), and modified, 107 F.T.C. 310 (1986). 
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market."66 Following a critical review of the Supreme Court opinions 
discussed above, Chief Judge Tjoflat also concluded, "Thus, evidence 
that a proposed acquisition would create significant efficiencies 
benefiting consumers is useful in evaluating the ultimate issue--the 
acquisition's overall effect on competition. We think, therefore, that an 
efficiency defense to the government's prima facie case in section 7 
challenges is appropriate in certain circumstances. "67 
Notwithstanding these cases, which have at least reflected favorably 
on efficiencies and the possibility of an efficiencies defense, there has 
also been continued doubt about the defense. For example, in United 
States v. Rockford Memorial Corporation68 the Court cited Philadelphia 
National Bank as authority for the proposition that its "exclusive role is 
to evaluate the merger's effect on competition for the relevant market 
and no more."69 The Court nonetheless reviewed the efficiency 
arguments advanced by the defendants, and concluded that most of these 
claimed efficiencies should be rejected because they could be realized by 
means other than merger. 70 
Thus, the judicial treatment of efficiencies and the notion of an 
efficiencies defense is inconclusive. On closer examination, earlier 
Supreme Court opinions, while suggestive of a bias against efficiencies, 
may not preclude the possibility of the defense. The most recent 
decisions generally reflect a willingness to explore efficiencies. 
However, it seems likely that judicial uncertainty will remain until such 
time as the Supreme Court provides a definitive ruling on the defense. 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. Efficiency as a Goal 
Assuming that the defense is not precluded, it is next appropriate to 
consider its theoretical foundations. The logical starting point is to 
consider the relationship of the defense to the goals of antitrust. There 
66. 938 F.2d at 1222. 
61. Id. The Court did qualify this proposition to some extent by stating that it was 
unnecessary to define the parameters of the defense because the appellees had failed to 
demonstrate significant efficiencies. The Court did note, however, that some limit may 
need to be placed on the defense, such as the need to establish that the efficiencies could 
not be achieved by other means. Id. at n.30. 
68. 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), ajf'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990). 
69. Id. at 1288-89. See also United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n, 1986-2 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 167,287, 61,458 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1986) (containing arguments relating 
to beneficial effects rejected on the basis of Philadelphia National Bank). 
70. Rociford Memorial Corp., 71 7 F. Supp. at 1290-9 I. 
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has been considerable debate on the goals of antitrust. Much of this 
debate has centered upon the place of efficiency in the scheme of 
antitrust.71 While it is generally agreed that antitrust laws are designed 
to promote competition, questions remain about why the competitive 
process is valued as highly as the ultimate goals of antitrust. Various 
goals have emerged over the first one hundred years of antitrust law in 
the United States, and there is, no doubt, considerable wisdom in the 
recent reflections of Professor Milton Handler that "eternal verity cannot, 
in an ever-changing world, be ascribed to any one school."72 
A detailed discussion of the goals of antitrust is beyond the scope of 
this Article. Rather, the issue is significant in the present context 
because of its importance to the theoretical foundations of the efficien-
cies defense. If efficiency is accepted as a proper goal of antitrust, then 
it is logical that the efficiencies defense should be acceptable in theory. 
However, the recognition of other goals will clearly impact on the 
treatment of efficiencies claims in certain cases. Where efficiencies and 
the other goals are not in conflict, no theoretical problems appear to 
emerge. But an inherent conflict frequently exists between efficiencies 
and the other recognized goals. In such circumstances, which values 
should prevail? 
While the advocates of the efficiency school of thought have 
proclaimed victory in the debate,73 such pronouncement is premature. 
A brief outline of the interpretative problems relating to the antitrust 
statutes and, in particular to section 7 of the Clayton Act, demonstrates 
why this is so. 
In assessing the goals of antitrust law in the United States, the matter 
is not exclusively one of economic theory. Rather, the relevant inquiry 
has its genesis in the open-ended provisions of the antitrust statutes. 
Fundamental terms such as "competition," "restraint of trade," "monopo-
lize," and "unfair methods of competition" are, without further defini-
tion, inherently vague. In such circumstances, principles of statutory 
71. For discussions of a range of views about the goals for antitrust, see Harlan 
M. Blake et al., The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 
(I 965); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political 
and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977). See also 
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980). 
72. Milton Handler, Antitrust Exchange, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1257 (1991). 
73. See, e. g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF ix-xiv, 426-29 (1993 ed.). 
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interpretation require analysis of legislative history to ascertain 
Congressional intent. Furthermore, where appropriate, such principles 
also require a prediction of what Congress would have wished had it 
considered a particular issue.74 These interpretative issues are impor-
tant in the present context because, when Congress first enacted antitrust 
Jaws in 1890, efficiency considerations did not receive any particular 
attention. The subsequent enactment of antitrust laws similarly did not 
focus on efficiencies. Indeed, Congress could not have had any 
appreciation of the new economic theories at the time it enacted these 
laws. Against this background, it is not surprising that conflicting views 
have emerged regarding the goals of antitrust. 
Notwithstanding certain "populist" goals, such as the protection of 
small businesses and the dispersion of economic power, which have 
figured in the legislative history of the antitrust laws, particularly in 
relation to the merger laws,75 the current debate about the goals of 
antitrust focuses upon two economic goals. One school of thought, 
commonly referred to as the "Chicago school," states that antitrust laws 
should promote allocative efficiency.76 Many scholars of this persua-
sion view allocative efficiency to be an absolute goal.77 Recently, a 
rival theory has emerged that antitrust laws should primarily be viewed 
to further what may be called a distributive goal which would prevent 
74. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U. S. 1018 (197 5) where it was noted: "We freely acknowledge that if we 
were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that 
compelled these conclusions, we would be unable to respond .... Our conclusions rest 
on case law and commentary ... and on our best judgment as to what Congress would 
have wished if these problems had occurred to it." Id. at 993. Robert Bork states that 
"A legislature may never address the issue of ultimate policy goals and yet write a law 
whose various categories and distinctions can be explained only by a particular policy. 
That policy may then quite legitimately be said to have been intended by the legislature, 
even though not a single member articulated it even to himself." BORK, supra note 73, 
at 57. Professors Areeda and Turner state: 
[I]n formulating rational antitrust rules and presumptions concerning various 
kinds of business conduct and market structures, one must pay close attention 
to what developing economic analysis and empirical studies have to say about 
them. Rational antitrust interpretation must be prepared to modify, retract, or 
expand its prohibitions when new economic insights strongly suggest that past 
rules no longer serve antitrust objectives. 
l AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at 31. 
75. For a discussion of the populist goals relating to the Celler-Kefauver 
amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act, see Bok, supra note 29, at 233-38. 
76. See infra part III.B. for a discussion of this concept. 
77. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 73, at 50-89; RICHARD A POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8 (1976); 1 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 31, at 
7-33. 
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the unfair acqms1t10n of consumers' wealth by firms with market 
power.78 This school of thought views consumers' surplus79 as the 
rightful entitlement of consumers. 
The division between these schools of thought centers, in large part, 
upon their different interpretation of what Congress meant when it 
referred to the concept of consumer welfare.80 While this debate has 
concentrated on the Congressional concerns leading to the enactment of 
the Sherman Act in 1890, the same policy issues were discussed in the 
deliberations leading to the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act and the Clayton and Celler-Kefauver Acts.81 
Those who advance allocative efficiency as the exclusive goal of 
antitrust assert that "the only legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximiza-
tion of consumer welfare."82 In this context it is suggested that: 
Consumer welfare is greatest when society's economic resources are allocated 
so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as technological 
constraints permit. Consumer welfare, in this sense, is merely another term for 
the wealth of the nation. Antitrust thus has a built-in preference for material 
prosperity, but it has nothing to say about the ways prosperity is distributed or 
used. Those are matters for other laws. 83 
However, in more recent times the legislative justification for this 
view has been challenged on the basis that "[g]iven the state of 
economic theory at that time, the assertion that legislators supporting the 
Sherman Act were influenced by considerations involving allocative 
efficiency is without credibility."84 Rather, it has been suggested that 
a proper review of the Congressional debates discloses a condemnation 
78. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 
(1982). 
79. See infra part lll.C. for a discussion of this concept. 
80. The term "consumer welfare" has been referred to as "the most abused term 
in modem antitrust analysis." Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: 
Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 
1032 (1987). It can have a variety of meanings. It can refer to economic efficiency (in 
which case the term seems unnecessary). It can also refer to some other undefined 
consumer interest or to consumers' surplus. 
81. See Lande, supra note 78, at I 06-42. 
82. BORK, supra note 73, at 7. See also I AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 3 I, at 
7. 
83. BORK, supra note 73, at 91. See also POSNER, supra note 77, at 8-18. 
84. Lande, supra note 78, at 89. See also Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & 
Economics, and the Courts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROSS., Autumn 1987, 181, 207-08. 
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of trusts and monopolies because of their ability to use market power to 
raise prices and extract wealth from consumers. Thus, in considering the 
concept of consumer welfare as Congress would have understood it back 
in 1890, it has been suggested that the primary concern was to ensure 
that consumers received the benefit of consumers' surplus.85 
Ultimately, in determining the goals of antitrust, the courts will need 
to recognize the "dynamic potential'' of the legislation.86 They will 
also need to objectively assess likely economic consequences having 
regard to current policies. The most recent commentaries reflect the 
potential that preference may be given to a consumer surplus-based 
standard.87 If greater weight is to attach to concerns about wealth 
transfer than to efficiencies, this need not result in a rejection of the 
defense. However, as will be discussed later,88 it will have the 
potential to impact, in a fundamental way, how the defense may be 
formulated and how it may apply in situations where the goals of 
efficiency and wealth transfer are in conflict. 
B. Efficiency as a Concept 
Before advancing to consider in more detail the specific theoretical 
foundations and possible elements of the efficiencies defense, it is 
convenient, by way of background, to reflect on the technical meanings 
that can be given to the concept of efficiencies. There are two key 
issues relevant to the present inquiry. First, what are the recognized 
components of efficiency, and second, what comparative weight should 
attach to each of these components? 
The concept of efficiency has received some analysis in the industrial 
organization economics literature. However, such analysis of this 
fundamental economic concept is not as advanced as may be expected. 
Generally speaking, economists view economic efficiency as referring to 
an event that increases the total value of all economically measurable 
assets in society. Economists divide the concept of efficiency into three 
components: Productive, allocative, and innovative efficiencies. These 
categories assist in recognizing the different efficiency qualities that may 
result from events such as horizontal mergers. 
Productive efficiency can best be explained with reference to the ratio 
of a firm's output to its inputs. Thus, if two firms are selling the same 
85. Lande, supra note 78, at 93-96. 
86. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). 
87. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 12, at 8-11; Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Wei/-
Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 74-94 (1990); HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 12, at 48-71. 
88. See discussion infra parts III.C., IV.C.2. 
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product at $100, one will be more efficient than the other if it functions 
on a lower level of inputs. Within the horizontal merger context, 
productive efficiency will be achieved if the merger results in a more 
cost-effective combination of productive resources of the merging firms 
than would be the case should they remain independent. A common 
example may be the merger of two firms each operating below minimum 
efficient scale. The merger of such firms may result in the reduction of 
long run average costs and this may lead to higher returns and the 
potential for the merged firm to become a more potent competitive force 
through, for example, reorganization of its plant. It was this category of 
efficiency which appeared to be the focus of attention in Brown Shoe 
and Procter & Gamble. 
Allocative efficiency is a more theoretical concept and is not self-
defining in the same way as productive efficiency. It refers to the 
welfare of society as a whole in the sense of the placement ofresources 
in the economy where consumers will most value their output. The 
concept can be explained in terms of a pricing system whereby the 
output of resources will be allocated to those buyers who value them 
most in terms of willingness to purchase the output or forego other 
consumption.89 Allocative efficiency is achieved when output is priced 
at marginal cost. There are two critical components in assessing the 
impact of an horizontal merger in allocative efficiency terms. The first 
is the elasticity of demand, and the second relates to the ability of the 
merged entity to reduce output or raise price. As will be discussed later, 
these variables give rise to serious measurement concems.90 
The final category, innovative efficiency, relates, as its language 
suggests, to achievements that will be made through invention, research 
and development, and the like.91 In the horizontal merger context, the 
question to be posed is "How does the proposal enhance innovative 
efficiency?" 
From this brief outline of the three recognized components of 
efficiency, it will be obvious that comparative assessments about the 
importance of each is likely to involve theoretical controversy. For 
89. See BORK, supra note 73, at 91-104; SCHERER & Ross, supra note 2, at I 9-29. 
90. See discussion infra part IV.C.1. 
91. In this context, it is interesting to note the recent argument of Pitofsky that 
there is the need for a new research and development defense to otherwise unlawful 
mergers. See Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 240-44. 
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example, Professor Joseph F. Brodley has recently challenged the 
traditional wisdom that allocative efficiency is the primary efficiency 
goal. While recognizing that such efficiency does maximize social 
wealth at a given point in time, he argues that innovative and productive 
efficiencies provide "a more powerful contribution to social wealth 
because they comprise the growth factors by which social wealth 
increases over time."92 This debate serves to illustrate the problems 
that would be inherent in any attempt to define an efficiencies defense 
based on differently weighted efficiency components. However, it is a 
debate which need not take place in the framing of any judge-made 
efficiencies defense. First, the categories of efficiency are not necessari-
ly in conflict,93 and second, rules can evolve without any need to 
resolve this debate. Each recognized form of efficiency will be 
considered in assessing the aggregate level of efficiencies, and there is 
no apparent need in this exercise to prefer one form of efficiency over 
another. In any event, and particularly in the case ofpremerger analysis, 
the likely efficiency claims will be exclusively productive and innovative 
in character. 94 
C. Efficiencies Defense in Principle 
Having outlined the relationship of the efficiencies defense to the 
goals of antitrust, and having considered the general characteristics 
attributable to efficiencies claims, it is next appropriate to consider the 
specific theoretical foundations which may apply to the defense in the 
merger context. 
The issue of the efficiencies defense will arise in cases where the 
combined market shares of the merging firms will be presumptively 
unlawful, and where such illegality is further indicated by existing 
concentration levels and the absence of other factors which may rebut 
the presumption, such as low entry barriers. Theoretically, where such 
mergers are also likely to result in significant efficiency gains, competi-
92. Brodley, supra note 80, at 1027. 
93. The concepts of allocative and productive efficiency co-exist in that "[t]he 
whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency 
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net 
loss in consumer welfare." See BORK, supra note 73, at 91. The concepts of productive 
and innovative efficiency are also compatible to the extent they relate to the growth of 
future social wealth. See Brodley, supra note 80, at I 026-28. 
94. For example, that the merger will: (a) Involve plant rationalization; (b) result 
in the reduction of Jong run average costs; ( c) combine head office and related functions; 
and (d) enhance research and development opportunities. Other claims such as 
distribution savings (and presumably enhanced export distribution opportunities), 
reductions in the cost of capital, and superior management wiJI also be frequently made. 
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tion may be enhanced, prices may not rise and there may be an 
improvement in resource allocation. However, viewed from a premerger 
perspective, such predictions will be difficult to make. Not surprisingly, 
the scholarship relating to the efficiencies defense has concentrated on 
the situation where there may be an increase in market power which may 
result in a reduction in output and an increase in price. 
Two divergent views have emerged in relation to this difficult 
theoretical question. The conflict between these views centers upon 
whether allocative efficiency or the prevention of wealth transfers is the 
preferred goal of antitrust. Economists have developed a model which 
adopts the former goal. However, the potential application of this model 
to provide a legal solution has been challenged in terms of its failure to 
account for issues relating to consumers' surplus and its inability to 
provide a practical framework for legal application. 
The economic analysis centers upon Williamson's tradeoff model, 










95. See Williamson, Economies/Welfare Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 21; 
Williamson, Defense Revisited, supra note 6, at 707. 
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This diagram illustrates the effects of a postmerger increase in market 
power. As a result of this increase, the firm will reduce its output from 
QI to Q2, and price will correspondingly increase from Pl to P2. 
Triangle Al represents the deadweight loss which will result from this 
reduction in output and increase in price. 
However, at the same time, the merger produces theoretically 
measurable economies, which result in a reduction in the firm's costs 
from ACI to AC2. Rectangle A2 represents the cost savings to be 
achieved from these economies. Williamsonian analysis asserts that if 
A2 is larger than Al, the merger will produce a net efficiency gain, even 
though it permits the firm to raise its price above its marginal cost. A2 
will often be larger than Al because the efficiency gains illustrated by 
A2 are spread over the entire output of the firm postmerger. In contrast, 
the deadweight losses in Al are spread over only the reduction in output. 
Williamson calculated that in a market with average elasticities of 
demand and supply, a merger that produced "non-trivial" economies of 
1.2% would be efficient, even if it resulted in an increase in price of 
10%.96 
Williamson's model has become recognized as the appropriate 
economic analysis of the tradeoffbetween efficiencies and market power. 
In essence, the framework is the standard economic methodology of 
maximizing economic efficiency. Thus, the gains from a merger are the 
decreases in resource costs of the merged firm and the losses are the 
standard deadweight losses of monopoly. The deadweight loss arising 
from decreased production can usually be outweighed by the cost 
savings that will extend to all products actually manufactured. The 
model, while attractive for its simplicity, is not however without 
significant qualification. Indeed, Williamson himself referred to it as 
"naive" and stated a range of qualifications.97 
Much has been written about the accuracy and workability of the 
Williamson model. 98 Such qualifications impact in a significant way 
on the utility of the model in the legal context. For present purposes, 
the most critical qualifying factor relates to Williamson's terms of 
reference concerning income distribution. Williamson refers to the 
96. Williamson, Economies/We/fare Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 22-23; Williamson, 
Defense Revisited, supra note 6, at 708-09. 
97. Williamson, Economies/Weifi,re Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 23-33; Williamson, 
Defense Revisited, supra note 6, at 710-13. 
98. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 73, at 109-15; Muris, supra note 26, at 388-93; 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 425-55; Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1624-51; Alan 
A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777, 794-809 
(1989). 
536 
[VOL. 33: 515, 1996] Search of a Defense 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
distribution of profits between consumers and producers as "a matter of 
indifference"99 and asserts that the "transformation of benefits from one 
form (consumers' surplus) to another (profit) is treated as a wash under 
the conventional welfare economics model."100 While there may be 
strong support for such a notion if economic efficiency is the sole goal 
of antitrust, 101 such proposition clearly strikes difficulties within the 
legal context if this is not the case. If the courts consider that they 
should take wealth transfer issues into account, questions must inevitably 
be asked about how such wealth transfers or consumers' surplus 
(represented by rectangle A3) should be factored into the equation. That 
Williamson's analysis does not account for income distribution renders 
his model potentially redundant if this approach is adopted. 
Some consideration has been given to how the model may be adjusted 
to account for this factor, but such attempts have failed to find an 
appropriate solution. 102 The most obvious solution would be to require 
that the tradeoff be calculated on the basis that the cost savings 
(represented by rectangle A2) will outweigh both the deadweight loss 
and consumers' surplus (represented by rectangles Al and A3). 
However, because of the likely magnitude of consumers' surplus in any 
given case, and the corresponding impact that this would have on the 
equation, this approach has not yet been advocated. 103 It has, however, 
been suggested that a price standard can be applied to the Williamson 
model whereby efficiency gains may be taken into account in circum-
stances where they are sufficient to prevent prices from rising. 104 
99. Williamson, Economies/Welfare Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 27. 
I 00. Williamson, Defense Revisited, supra note 6, at 711. 
IOI. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 73, at I 10-12 (explaining that the Williamson 
model addresses the total welfare of consumers as a class, noting that shifts in income 
distribution do not lessen total welfare and suggesting that decisions about the 
beneficiaries of wealth should be made by the legislature rather than the judiciary). 
102. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1631-34; Fisher et al., supra note 98, 
at 794-809. 
I 03. See Paul S. Crampton, The Efficiency Exception for Mergers: An Assessment 
of Early Signals from the Competition Tribunal, 21 CAN. Bus. L.J. 371,389 n.56 (1993). 
I 04. See Fisher et al., supra note 98, at 796. A further theory which is currently 
being developed, and which has the potential to impact significantly on this question of 
consumers' surplus if it is accepted, is that efficiency improvements may offset the loss 
of consumers' surplus resulting from an increase in price. Professors Gary Roberts and 
Steven Salop argue that rivals will attempt to overcome the competitive advantages 
created by merger-specific efficiencies by attempting to imitate those efficiencies or by 
attempting to emulate them by achieving other efficiencies. For a discussion of the 
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However, this proposition is questionable in circumstances where the 
merged firm will have the ability to reduce output. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to imagine that such a price standard, which in essence requires 
the maintenance of price at level P 1, is capable of forming the basis of 
a workable legal rule. Difficult questions will emerge concerning the 
time frame for monitoring the price standard and the circumstances, if 
any, in which upward adjustments may be made. 
There are other significant qualifications to the Williamson model, 
apart from wealth transfer considerations. Detailed discussion of these 
is beyond the scope of this Article, but several examples illustrate the 
point. The model assumes a static context which does not account or 
provide for changes in product quality, or an accurate analysis over an 
appropriate length of time. 105 Wider industry analysis will also be 
required to assess the net social costs or benefits of a merger. Such 
analysis could either support or detract from the tradeoff calculation. 
For example, if the merged firm was large relative to the industry, it 
may provide a price structure under which others would be required to 
behave competitively.106 But equally, significant concentration could 
raise the probability of industry-wide collusion. 107 
IV. TOWARDS A DEFENSE 
A. Outline 
Against the background of the uncertain theoretical foundations to the 
efficiencies defense, attempts to formulate the structure and elements of 
the defense will involve a number of complex issues. While there may 
be no necessity to distinguish between the various forms of efficiency, 
the major concern is how to accommodate the situation where efficiency 
and the transfer of consumers' wealth are in conflict. No matter how 
compelling the efficiencies claims may be, it is difficult to imagine that 
courts will neglect consumers' surplus concerns having regard to the 
legislative history of the antitrust laws. But, how to account for such 
concerns and balance these with the efficiency claims will prove a 
unpublished draft study of Roberts and Salop, see Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and 
Merger Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 522-27 (1994). The argument has certain 
attractions in the context of developing an appropriate economic framework. However, 
its translation into a test of legal application has the potential to involve insurmountable 
problems because it will be impossible to predict, let alone attempt to calculate, the 
likely imitation and emulation responses of rivals. 
105. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1634-36. 
106. See Williamson, Economies/We/fare Tradeojfs, supra note 6, at 27. 
107. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1636-38. 
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difficult task. There is no clear solution to how these conflicting values 
can be accommodated in a test of universal application. 
There are two structural options for the efficiencies defense, namely 
a net efficiencies test and an absolute test. This section considers 
whether a net efficiencies test or an absolute test should be adopted. It 
then addresses three problems which are likely to be most controversial 
in relation to the defense, whether it be a net efficiency or an absolute 
defense. These issues are: (1) Whether the defense should be rejected 
because of measurement ambiguities; (2) whether the defense should set 
a distributional standard requiring that cost savings be passed on to 
consumers; and (3) whether the defense should be available if the 
claimed efficiencies can be achieved by other means such as internal 
expansion or joint ventures. Finally, consideration will be given to the 
role of enforcement discretion, a matter which will assume particular 
significance if judicial treatment of the defense does not advance beyond 
the current position. 
B. Structure of the Defense 
If the defense is adopted by the courts, the initial debate is likely to 
relate to its structure. This issue is allied to questions about measure-
ment ambiguity. 108 The various qualities of a net efficiency and an 
absolute defense will require consideration. The distinction between 
these tests may not always be clear in their formulation, 109 but the two 
approaches clearly have the potential to apply in different ways. 
The net efficiency test is likely to be open-ended in its applica-
tion.110 Under this test concentration levels significantly in excess of 
l 08. See infra part IV.C. l. 
109. It is interesting to note that there is still debate about the nature of the failing 
company defense, whether it be absolute or a factor to be weighed against the test of 
presumptive illegality, notwithstanding that the defense was first recognized by the 
Supreme Court back in I 930. See Walthall, supra note 24, at 59-62; Friedman, supra 
note 24, at 1398-99. 
110. Different versions of net efficiency tests are to be found in some foreign 
jurisdictions. For example, (a) Canada: § 96 of the Competition Act 1986 (Can.) 
prevents the Competition Tribunal from making an order in respect of a merger if it "has 
brought about or is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater than, and 
will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition that will result or 
is likely to result from the merger or proposed merger." Competition Act 1986 § 96 
(Can.). For a discussion of the elements of this provision see PAUL S. CRAMPTON, 
MERGERS AND THE COMPETITION ACT 495-554 (1990). To date, § 96 considerations do 
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those which raise presumptive illegality concerns under the Merger 
Guidelines may be lawful because the magnitude of the claimed 
efficiencies will rebut the presumption of illegality. Some may prefer 
this approach because it will provide courts with greater flexibility. But 
equally, it may increase business uncertainty in circumstances where 
widely divergent outcomes have the potential to emerge. Such 
uncertainty may well raise compliance costs as firms endeavor to 
identify mergers which will be acceptable under the antitrust laws. 
Attempts to analyze such issues may also, in the context of a broad net 
efficiency test, present insurmountable problems for the firm and its 
advisers. Ultimately, such uncertainty may also deter firms from 
engaging in merger activity. 111 Depending upon the caution with 
which the courts may apply a net efficiencies defense, there is also the 
potential for considerable debate to emerge about the levels of market 
power which may be permitted to result from mergers. 
not appear to have been particularly influential in the few cases which have considered 
them. See Donald G. Mcfetridge, The Prospects for the Efficiency Defence, 26 CAN. 
Bus. L.J. 321 (1996). (b) Germany: Section 24(3) of the Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen provids that the Federal Minister of Economics may 
permit mergers which have been vetoed by the Federal Cartel Office where "the restraint 
of competition is outweighed by advantages to the whole economy resulting from the 
merger or if the merger is justified by a predominating public interest." The Minister 
has intervened in very few cases. See James F. Ponsoldt and Christian Westerhausen, 
Competition and/or Efficiency: A Review of West German Antimerger Law as a Model 
for the Proposed Treatment of Efficiency Promotion Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
9 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 296, 326-31 (1988). (c) Australia and New Zealand: In both 
Australia and New Zealand mergers that would otherwise breach the relevant 
competition thresholds may be authorized on public benefit grounds by the Australian 
Trade Practices Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission. See Trade 
Practices Act 1974 § 90(9) (Aust!.); Commerce Act 1986 § 67 (N.Z.). The concept of 
public benefit has been held to include efficiencies considerations in both jurisdictions. 
See In re Queensland Coop. Milling Ass'n Ltd., 8 A.LR. 481, 516 (1976); Telecom 
Corp. ofN.Z. Ltd. v. Commerce Commission, 3 New Zealand Bus. L. Cases (CCH) ,i 
99-239, at 102,385 (Dec. 10, 1991). Sec. 3A of the Commerce Act 1986 (N.Z.) further 
provides that efficiencies must be taken into account in determining the public benefit. 
Nine mergers have been authorized on public benefit grounds in Australia. For a 
discussion of these decisions, see Australian Trade Pracs. Rep. (CCH) ,i,i 8-637 to 8-642 
and 8-644 to 8-646 (1995). Six mergers raising dominance concerns have also been 
authorized in New Zealand on public benefit grounds. See In re New Zealand Coop. 
Dairy Co. Ltd - Auckland Coop. Milk Producers Ltd. I New Zealand Bus. L.Cases 
(CCH) ,i 99-518 (Commerce Commission Apr. 26, 1988); In re Natural Gas Waikato 
Limited, Commerce Commission Decision 217 (May 24, 1988); New Zealand Coop. 
Dairy Co. Ltd. v. Commerce Commission 3 New Zealand Bus. L. Cases (CCH) ,i 99-
219 (Aug. 7, 1991); In re Kiwi Coop. Dairies Ltd., Commerce Commission Decision 267 
(Apr. 9, 1992); In re Natural Gas Corp. ofN. Z. Ltd., Commerce Commission Decision 
269 (Oct. 29, 1992); Enerco New Zealand Ltd., Commerce Commission Decision 272 
(Dec. 22, 1993). 
111. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1654-56. 
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In contrast, the defense in an absolute form will, while limiting its 
potential scope, result in greater certainty and preclude the potential for 
the defense to have sweeping application. Several attempts have been 
made at formulating an absolute efficiencies defense. For example, 
Professors Areeda and Turner suggest the following absolute defense: 
I. The defense should not be available where market demand is growing 
substantially, unless entry clearly is easy. 
2. The defense should be limited to cases in which both merging firms suffer 
from substantial cost disadvantages of 5 percent, or more, from diseconomies 
of scale. 
3. The defense should be limited to economies in (a) plant size, (b) plant 
specialization, where there is product complementarity and the diseconomies 
extend to 70-80 percent of the firm's output; and possibly economies in (c) 
distribution, ( d) research and development, and ( e) promotion, though in each 
of the last three instances, the case is weak and there are qualifications. 112 
The approach suggested by Areeda and Turner has not been embraced 
in subsequent suggested formulations of an absolute defense. 113 
Rather, given the difficulties in recognizing the impact of efficiencies, 
the view is emerging that it will be most appropriate to implicitly 
incorporate efficiencies into the analysis by raising the market share 
thresholds of presumptive illegality.114 Clearly, such an approach will 
not be capable of properly recognizing and giving appropriate weight to 
all relevant efficiency gains. However, from the point of view of 
certainty and predictability the approach will have its advantages, 
depending on how readily the relevant market may be identified. 
Furthermore, such an approach has the potential to simplify the litigation 
process and generally to reduce compliance costs. Professor Robert 
Pitofsky has provided the most recent suggestion of an absolute 
formulation of the efficiencies defense. He submits that: 
112. 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at 147-48. Certain other proof 
requirements also form part of this test. Id. at 148. 
I 13. Indeed, certain aspects of the Areeda and Turner formulation have been 
questioned. It has been suggested that it is inappropriate to limit the application of the 
defense to markets that are declining, stable or expanding very slowly. See Pitofsky, 
supra note 7, at 221. In this context the Areeda and Turner test may be challenged by 
its implicit recognition that the possibility of internal expansion may preclude the 
application of the efficiencies defense. It has also been suggested that the defense 
should be available where the potential cost savings are at a lower level than five 
percent, such as one to two percent. See Muris, supra note 26, at 418. 
114. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1669-77. Areeda and Turner reject the 
need for market shares to be factored into the formulation of any absolute efficiencies 
defense. See 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at 197. 
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In any market where postmerger concentration is moderate, and the combined 
company after the merger would hold less than thirty-five percent of the market, 
a horizontal merger should be legal if the defendants can clearly support the 
claim that production efficiencies leading to a substantial reduction in unit costs 
will result and these efficiencies could not be achieved through a much less 
restrictive altemative. 115 
Given the complexity of the efficiencies defense and the uncertainty 
that may attach to any unlimited formulation of the defense it seems 
likely that, if the defense is to develop, it will do so in some absolute 
form. The Pitofsky formulation provides a suitable starting point if this 
approach is adopted, although the question will inevitably arise whether 
the thirty-five percent market share level is appropriate. Such an 
approach is likely to be viewed as the best practical option, although 
clearly it will be open to criticism to the extent that it may not give 
appropriate weight to claimed efficiencies in any given case. 
C. Three Problems 
1. Measurement Ambiguities 
Judge (then Professor) Posner has referred to efficiencies as "an 
intractable subject for litigation."116 This is the generally acknowl-
edged view/ 17 and indeed, problems surrounding the measurement of 
efficiencies have even caused leading Chicago school scholars to reject 
the efficiencies defense. 118 
To begin, there are information problems. The merging firms may be 
the only potential source of information about the claimed efficiencies. 
Clearly, they will have the incentive to exaggerate their efficiency claims 
and to ignore any potential diseconomies or other costs. Confidentiality 
issues may also impact upon the flow of information and the weight that 
115. Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 218. It is also possible to interpret one other 
suggested formulation of the defense as absolute. Muris suggests that measurement 
difficulties should not preclude the application of the defense and that the merger should 
be judged to be procompetitive in a showing of "nontrivial economies." This seems an 
extreme formulation which is unlikely to receive judicial acceptance. See Muris, supra 
note 26, at 419-26. 
116. POSNER, supra note 77, at 112. 
117. Some economists may suggest that efficiencies are quantifiable. See, e.g., Avi 
Weiss, Using the Efficiencies Defense in Horizontal Mergers, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 123 
(1992). However, such attempted formulations of the defense do not provide an 
appropriate framework for legal analysis. 
118. BORI<, supra note 73, at 124-29; POSNER, supra note 77, at 112. 
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can be attached to it. 119 A further problem is the speculative nature of 
the claims. Such claims will typically be made in a premerger context 
in which the decision-makers can do no more than predict future 
industry outcomes. 120 It is, therefore, inevitable that efficiency claims 
should be viewed with skepticism and treated with caution. 
Different levels of measurement ambiguities arise in relation to the net 
efficiency and absolute defense tests suggested above. Indeed, the 
absolute defense proposals have been advanced in large part for the 
reason that they will lead to greater certainty in the decision-making 
process. 
It is generally acknowledged that the Williamson tradeoff model does 
not have practical application in analyzing individual merger proposals. 
Professor Robert H. Bork states the reasons for this: 
Possibly accurate measurement of the actual situation [involving the measure-
ment of efficiencies and dead weight loss] is not even a theoretical possibility; 
much less is there any hope of arriving at a correct estimate of the hypothetical 
situation. Consider two of the factors that would have to be known: The 
demand curve over all possible relevant ranges of output and the marginal cost 
curve over those same ranges. Only by knowing where marginal cost and 
demand intersect could one know whether there was a restriction of output and 
what its size was. Nobody knows these curves. Even the companies involved 
do not .... 
There is a good reason why firms do not know these things, and it is the 
same reason why they cannot be known through an antitrust trial. The demand 
curve is not known because it changes continually and because the company is 
not constantly plotting it by running its prices up and down. The attempt to do 
so might make a minor contribution to science, but quite a research grant would 
119. For further discussion of information problems, see Dennis A. Yao & Thomas 
N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on 
Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L. J. 23, 28-35 (1993). 
120. Such problems may be overcome under a regime, such as Canada's, where 
mergers may be conditionally cleared and then subsequently reviewed to determine if 
the claimed efficiencies have eventuated. However, there is strong opposition to such 
an approach in the U. S. Postrnerger evidence may not be reliable, because the merged 
firm can manipulate prices and costs. Market outcomes, such as the departure of a rival, 
are also beyond the control of the merged firm. There is also a strong judicial reluctance 
to supervising future industry conduct and a concern that a policy of postmerger analysis 
may discourage firms from engaging in merger activity. For further discussion of the 
case against postrnerger review, see Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 222-27. Cf Brodley, 
supra note 80, at I 048-53 (arguing that there should be a two-stage procedure: First, 
analyze whether the efficiencies were plausible; second, an ex post inquiry to determine 
if, in fact, the promised efficiencies had resulted). 
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be required, since the losses incurred in an attempt by a major company might 
make serious inroads on the resources of even the Ford Foundation. 121 
But allocative efficiency claims are seldom likely to be advanced in 
justification of a merger, particularly in the premerger setting. Rather, 
a range of productive and innovative efficiency claims will typically be 
advanced. The most compelling claim for the efficiencies defense arises 
where each of the merging firms is operating below minimum efficient 
scale and where there is product complementarity. While there may not 
be definitive data available to prove that each firm's plant is substantially 
below the size necessary for minimum cost production, it has been 
suggested that sufficiently reliable information should be available and 
that "the practical problems in proving diseconomies of plant size do not 
appear to be sufficiently serious to warrant disregarding the defense on 
that score alone."122 
Other less compelling efficiency claims are also likely to emerge such 
as distribution economies, promotional economies, economies in research 
and development, capital cost economies, and the introduction of 
superior management. Apart from the validity of, and qualifications 
which may need to be attached to, a number of these claims in the 
context of an efficiencies defense, 123 they each (with the possible 
exception of capital cost economies) raise complex issues of proof. 
Distribution economies involve economies of integration of a transaction 
cost variety, and these are typically difficult to quantify. 124 In the case 
of promotional economies, the relationship between promotional 
expenditure and revenue returns is uncertain. 125 Research and develop-
ment economies are particularly problematic from a proof point of 
view, 126 as are claims about superior management. 127 
121. BORI<, supra note 73, at 125-26. 
122. 4 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 3 I, at I 76. Areeda and Turner also suggest 
that a strong claim of efficiency can be made based on plant specialization economies 
where product complementarity requires offering a range of products and where small 
firms suffer diseconomies over a high proportion of their output. They do not envision 
significant proof problems attaching to such claims. Id. at 178-81. 
123. Areeda and Turner challenge the validity of claims about capital cost 
economies because they are likely to be either small or realizable by other means; they 
also submit that claims about superior management cannot be accepted in the context of 
the defense. They attach a range of prerequisites to their acceptance of claims about 
distribution economies (e.g., there will be economies in integration). Areeda and Turner 
view claims about the promotional efficiencies to be relatively weak, but conclude that 
they should not be rejected in principle. They also attach a set of prerequisites to such 
claims (e.g., the merging firms should be operating at a substantial disadvantage which 
cannot be overcome by means other than horizontal merger). Id. at 181-99. 
124. Id. at 184. 
125. Id. at 188. 
126. Id. at 189-90. 
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Measurement ambiguities will be most significant in the case of a net 
efficiency test. Such a test is likely to be based upon some broad 
formulation under which the merger may be permitted if the claimed 
efficiencies are of such magnitude as to outweigh the detriments likely 
to result from the attainment or strengthening of market power. 128 
However, such methodology will be without analytical rigor, 129 and it 
will be exceedingly difficult under this approach for firms and their 
advisers to predict the outcome of any given case. Further problems 
also inevitably arise in this context about the ability of the Antitrust 
Division, the Federal Trade Commission, and the courts to perform the 
balancing test accurately. For these reasons, it has been strongly urged 
that such case-by-case analysis be avoided. 130 
Measurement ambiguities will also attach to absolute formulations of 
the defense. For example, under the Areeda and Turner formulation the 
calculation of "substantial cost disadvantages" and the diseconomies of 
plant size and plant specialization may not be straightforward. 131 
Similarly, the Pitofsky formulation does not define in further detail what 
is meant by "production efficiencies leading to a substantial reduction in 
unit costs." However, these measurement difficulties are likely to be 
much less severe than those which may arise under a net efficiency test. 
Further, concerns about measurement ambiguities are reduced under an 
absolute formulation of the test, such as that provided by Pitofsky, where 
there is some restriction placed on the likely postmerger power which 
the merged firm will enjoy. These reasons reflect that an absolute 
formulation of the defense is preferable and that the defense need not be 
rejected because of measurement ambiguities. 
2. Distributional Issues Relating to Cost Savings 
In formulating the elements of an efficiencies defense, the question 
arises whether the merging firms should be required to demonstrate that 
127. Id. at 193-94. See also Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 209. 
128. For a discussion of foreign jurisdictions which have adopted such an approach, 
see supra note 110. 
129. As Pitofsky observes: "It is difficult to trade off the advantages of lower unit 
costs against the disadvantages of reduced competition as a result of the merger." 
Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 210. 
I 30. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1652-59. 
I 3 I. Areeda and Turner have outlined the problems of proof inherent in their 
formulations. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14. 
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the efficiency gains will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower 
prices. This issue is concerned with cost savings (represented by area 
A2 in Figure 1) rather than consumers' surplus. The question is whether 
the merged firm should be required to demonstrate that it will reduce the 
price for its goods to reflect the reduction in its average costs from AC 1 
to AC2. While there is some support for such a requirement,132 the 
predominant view is against this proposition for both theoretical and 
practical reasons. 
Theoretically, the question can be approached at several levels. Some 
would argue that antitrust laws are not concerned with the distribution 
of wealth, and that the question of such distribution is a policy choice 
to be made by the legislature, rather than the judiciary, pursuant to other 
policy instruments such as taxation laws.133 However, the validity of 
such explanation must be called into question if the transfer of consum-
ers' surplus to firms with market power is considered inappropriate from 
a policy perspective. There is, simply put, a logical inconsistency 
between recognizing distributional standards in the case of consumers' 
surplus, and then rejecting such standards in the case of cost savings. 
However, there are other theoretical arguments in support of not 
requiring that cost savings be passed on to consumers, even if consum-
ers' surplus is considered to be the entitlement of consumers. First, 
notwithstanding that a firm will reap additional rewards as it becomes 
more efficient, this will not lessen total wealth, and consumers will not 
be worse off if prices do not rise postmerger. On the contrary, 
consumers have the potential to be better off if other competitors attempt 
to "imitate" and "emulate" the advantages achieved by such efficien-
cies.134 Second, there is the question of incentives and the need to 
encourage the achievement of economic efficiency. It is inappropriate 
to discourage, and in one sense unfair to punish, those who have 
invested in discovering new and more efficient ways, by requiring them 
to pass on the rewards to others. Inevitably, society will be better off 
where there prevails an environment which is conducive to innovation 
and efficiency. 
132. See American Medical Int'!, Inc., I 04 F.T.C. I, 219 (1984); United States v. 
United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D. Del. 1991). See also LAWRENCE A. 
SULLJV AN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 631 ( 1977). The Merger Guidelines 
also implicitly adopt this requirement by linking efficiencies to lower prices to 
consumers. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, § 4. 
133. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition 
and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195-96 (1977); I 
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at I 8-19; BORK, supra note 73, at 110-12. 
134. The concepts of competitive "imitation" and "emulation" are those suggested 
by Roberts and Salop. See supra note I 04. 
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A further reason for rejecting the requirement that efficiencies be 
passed on to consumers relates to problems of proof. It is not apparent 
that evidence can be introduced in support of this proposition. At best, 
planning documents estimating a postmerger price reduction or evidence 
of customers supporting the merger may be introduced. However, these 
forms of evidence are clearly open to manipulation and it will be 
exceedingly difficult to distinguish between true and false claims. 
Pitofsky has suggested that: 
The only sure way of making such a showing [that efficiency gains will be 
passed on to consumers] would be to prove that the merger is taking place in 
a near perfectly competitive market, and therefore that market forces would 
require that the efficiency be passed on to consumers. But if that were the 
case--if the market were that competitive--the merger would not have been a 
matter of concern in the first place. 135 
Strictly construed, this qualification to the efficiencies defense has the 
potential to render it redundant or to frustrate its use. Having regard to 
questionable theoretical foundations and potentially insurmountable 
problems of proof, 136 it is inappropriate that the efficiencies defense 
should be conditioned upon the requirement that the efficiency gains be 
shown to pass on to consumers. 
3. Internal Expansion and Alternative Forms of Organization 
A further issue requiring consideration in the formulation of an 
efficiencies defense is whether the merging firms should be required to 
demonstrate that the claimed efficiencies are not achievable by other 
means, such as internal expansion or the formation of joint ventures. 
It has been suggested that there is a "bias ingrained in section 7 
favoring internal expansion."137 The formulations of the defense 
contained in the Merger Guidelines138 and the Pitofsky proposal 
135. Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 207-08. 
136. A suggested solution to the problem of proof is that "rather than an outright 
ban on consideration of efficiencies for which a pass-through to consumers cannot be 
strongly guaranteed, a more appropriate approach would value the magnitude of the 
efficiency and the probability that it will be achieved by the merger." See Yao & 
Dahdouh, supra note 119, at 44. This solution appears to be no more than a suggestion 
that some form of net efficiency defense may be appropriate. 
137. Rogers, supra note 3 I, at 525. 
138. Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, § 4. 
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expressly recognize this requirement. 139 The formulation suggested by 
Areeda and Turner also implicitly accommodates this consideration. 140 
There is an obvious logic to this requirement. It appears appropriate that 
courts should, for example, inquire whether the acquiring firm's capital 
could be used to expand the firm's existing production facilities rather 
than to purchase the shares or assets of a competitor. However, 
acceptance of this requirement raises further obstacles to the emergence 
of a workable efficiencies defense. 
First, legal analysis of whether internal expansion is preferable is an 
exercise which is likely to involve considerable uncertainty. For 
example, it may be argued that internal expansion is preferable because 
of the benefits of internal planning and internal implementation, and 
because the creation of new capacity will increase output and stimulate 
competition in the market. But it is also not difficult to predict a range 
of arguments which suggest that merger is preferable to internal 
expansion. For example, the merger may involve a matching of 
resources not achievable through internal expansion, internal expansion 
may be more costly and involve delays and the failure to merge may 
result in the exit of a competitor from the market. 141 
Secondly, consideration of these issues has the potential to raise 
difficult matters of proof. There is likely to be a general lack of reliable 
information. In some cases, the merger and other options may be 
documented to explain the decision in favor of the merger. However, 
such exercise is likely to venture largely into the realms of speculation 
139. Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 218. 
140. 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 31, at 147-48. There is also some case law 
to support this requirement that efficiencies claims should be rejected if they are 
achievable by means independent of merger. See United States v. Rockford Memorial 
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1290-91 (N.D. Ill. 1989); United States v. lvaco, Inc., 704 F. 
Supp. 1409, 1425-27 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
141. For more detailed consideration of these arguments, see 4 AREEDA & TuRNER, 
supra note 31, at 161-69. Areeda and Turner also discuss whether internal expansion 
is likely to occur having regard to the cost of expansion, the resultant unit cost savings 
and the likely downward price effect resulting from the additional output. Other 
variables impact on the equation such as product differentiation, the demand for the 
product, and the likelihood of new entry or expansion by incumbents. While it is 
appropriate to recognize the potential impact of these factors in the analysis of whether 
the efficiencies are achievable by internal expansion, it seems that any attempt to 
incorporate these factors into the defense is unlikely to succeed because of the widely 
divergent nature of the facts of each case. See also Muris, supra note 26, at 389-92. 
Muris argues that there are at least four reasons why the possibility of internal growth 
does not rebut the Williamson presumption in favor of efficiency from mergers. First, 
internal expansion may increase costs relative to production. Second, since cartels are 
unstable, their market power tends to dissipate. Third, the possibility that collusion will 
be facilitated is slight. Fourth, where demand is stable, concentration increases just as 
much with internal growth as with mergers. 
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and in many cases there will be uncertainty and conflict about how any 
predicted situation should be analyzed. There may, nonetheless, be some 
situations where the decision to merge is based upon a sound theoretical 
basis and the conclusions advanced that such a merger may be the 
preferred route will be all the more convincing if there is appropriate 
supporting evidence, such as testimony from suitably qualified indepen-
dent parties and relevant industry studies. 142 Nonetheless, in most 
cases there will be information uncertainties and in such circumstances 
it seems appropriate to impose a relatively weak standard of proof. 
Otherwise, this requirement would have the potential to make the 
defense generally unavailable. 143 
The other alternative to a merger which warrants brief consideration 
is the possibility that the same outcome may be achieved through 
contractual relations, such as a joint venture. Two firms may, for 
example, agree jointly to operate the inefficient divisions of their 
businesses while still competing in all other respects. To this extent, 
such joint venture arrangements may be preferable to a full merger. 144 
However, there are various operational and competitive concerns under 
the joint venture option which negate its desirability as an element of the 
efficiencies defense. Significant disputes may arise concerning the 
operation of a joint venture. It is also inevitable that anticompetitive 
concerns may arise relating to the operation of joint ventures. For 
example, products may become standardized and coordination of pricing 
and marketing may result. These are strong reasons not to advance this 
form of organization as a preferable option to merger for the purposes 
of the efficiencies defense. 145 
142. For a general discussion relating to the problems of proof in this situation, see 
Yao & Dabdoub, supra note I 19, at 35-41. 
143. Id. The current Merger Guidelines arguably contain such a weak standard of 
proof by providing that efficiencies will be rejected "if equivalent or comparable savings 
can reasonably be achieved by the parties through other means." See Merger Guidelines, 
supra note 11, § 4. 
144. For more detailed discussion of the policy considerations relating to this issue, 
see John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and 
Alternatives to Merger: A Policy Synthesis, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 431, at 438-41 (1986). 
145. For further discussion on the operational and competitive concerns relating to 
joint ventures and the efficiencies defense, see 4 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 31, at 
169-71. 
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D. Enforcement Discretion 
The discussion thus far has focused upon problems that the courts will 
face in the formulation and application of an efficiencies defense. In 
many cases, such problems will have the potential to make the defense 
either unavailable or difficult to satisfy. In such circumstances, 
enforcement discretion will be an issue which will assume considerable 
importance. In appropriate cases, the relevant authorities may elect to 
permit and not to challenge mergers involving market power concerns 
on the basis of convincing efficiencies, even though there may be 
questions about whether such efficiencies may satisfy the courts. 
Various factors will impact upon the significance and effectiveness of 
such discretionary powers. Obviously, the policies of the relevant 
authorities will dictate their approach to the defense. Other factors may 
be equally critical, such as the extent to which the agencies will test the 
evidence of efficiencies. Close scrutiny may result in greater delays and 
uncertainty than would be the case under the normal judicial process. 
The information problems are likely to be significant given that the 
agencies will be relying upon the evidence of the merging firms, and it 
may be particularly difficult to evaluate this evidence in many cases. 146 
The effectiveness of this option will also depend upon the confidence 
that the business community has in the process. This will depend in 
large part on the perceived reliability of the enforcement agencies, as 
well as their predictability and consistency. This final point leads 
conveniently into a brief consideration of the current policies of the 
relevant U.S. agencies towards the efficiencies defense. The positions 
taken by the federal antitrust agencies, the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission, and the State Attorneys General are 
potentially in conflict on the question of how efficiencies should be 
analyzed. 
The Merger Guidelines, 147 which were adopted jointly for the first 
time by the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the Federal 
Trade Commission in 1992, reflect that the agencies clearly recognize 
146. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1665-66. Situations may nonetheless 
arise where efficiency claims can be independently verified. For example, the recent 
report of the Defense Science Board Task Force suggested that the Department of 
Defense could play a constructive role in substantiating efficiencies claims advanced in 
support of defense industry consolidations. See DEFENSE SCIENCE BD. TASK FORCE, 
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON 
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION 28-31 (April 1994). 
14 7. Merger Guidelines, supra note I I. 
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efficiencies as a mitigating factor in the evaluation of mergers involving 
market power. The Merger Guidelines provide in pertinent part that: 
The primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their efficiency-enhancing 
potential, which can increase the competitiveness of firms and result in lower 
prices to consumers .... 
Some mergers that the Agency otherwise might challenge may be reasonably 
necessary to achieve significant net efficiencies. Cognizable efficiencies 
include, but are not limited to, achieving economies of scale, better integration 
of production facilities, plant specialization, lower transportation costs, and 
similar efficiencies relating to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution 
operations of the merging firms. The Agency may also consider claimed 
efficiencies resulting from reductions in general selling, administrative, and 
overhead expenses, or that otherwise do not relate to specific manufacturing, 
servicing, or distribution operations of the merging firms, although, as a 
practical matter, these types of efficiencies may be difficult to demonstrate. In 
addition, the Agency will reject claims of efficiencies if equivalent or 
comparable savings can reasonably be achieved by the parties through other 
means. The expected net efficiencies must be greater the more significant are 
the competitive risks identified .... 148 
Certain familiar themes emerge from this test. A net efficiencies 
approach is adopted which is based upon the balancing of productive 
efficiencies and competitive risks. The test also requires that the 
efficiencies be merger-specific. Although the Merger Guidelines no 
longer refer to the onus and burden of proof, it appears that no change 
was intended to the prior position, namely that the merging firms must 
148. Id. § 4. For a discussion of the historical approach to efficiencies in the 
Merger Guidelines, see Steve Stockum, The Efficiencies Defense for Horizontal Mergers: 
What is the Government's Standard?, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 829, 831-34 (1993). The 
1968 and 1982 Merger Guidelines reflected an hostility to efficiency claims. They 
would only be entertained in "exceptional circumstances" and "extraordinary cases" 
where there was "convincing evidence" that the merger would produce substantial cost 
savings. A significant shift in attitude occurred under the 1984 Merger Guidelines in 
which it was accepted that some mergers "may be reasonably necessary to achieve 
significant net efficiencies." Id. at 832. The burden of proof under the 1984 Merger 
Guidelines required "clear and convincing evidence" that the merger would achieve the 
claimed efficiencies, and that these could not reasonably be achieved through other 
means. Id. The adequacy of the current Merger Guidelines provisions concerning 
efficiencies has been recently re-examined by the Federal Trade Commission. The 
Commission has proposed that it should establish a joint task force, together with the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, to consider how the Merger Guidelines 
can be further clarified to provide an efficiency justification. For discussion of the 
Commission's proposals regarding how efficiencies may be analyzed, see FTC REP., 
Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace, 
vol. I, ch. 2, pp. 2-3 (May 1996). 
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establish the efficiencies with clear and convincing evidence. 149 While 
there are certain strict elements to this test which may be difficult to 
establish (such as clear and convincing efficiencies, merger-specific 
efficiencies, and lowering of prices to consumers), it nonetheless reflects 
an increasing tolerance on the part of these federal antitrust agencies to 
the possibility that efficiencies may be a mitigating factor. 150 Nonethe-
less, the strictness of the test in the longer term will depend on the 
manner in which these agencies may exercise their discretion in any 
case. 
In contrast, the State Attorneys General view efficiencies with greater 
skepticism. This is hardly surprising given their incentives to protect 
local firms. The recently released Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the 
National Association of Attorneys General151 reflect an hostility to 
efficiencies claims. Notwithstanding that the NAAG Merger Guidelines 
conclude that there is no efficiencies defense, 152 they set forth a 
stringent test for the consideration of efficiencies claims. Efficiencies 
will be considered in "rare situations ... when the merging parties can 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the merger will lead 
to significant efficiencies."153 Further, it must be "demonstrate[d] that 
the efficiencies will ensure that consumer prices will not increase," that 
"equivalent or comparable [cost] savings cannot be achieved through 
other means and that [the] cost savings will persist over the long 
run."154 While it has been suggested that the degree to which the 
NAAG Merger Guidelines will be followed may vary substantially across 
the states, 155 it appears that given the strict requirements of this test the 
State Attorneys General will rarely be influenced by efficiencies claims 
in their enforcement decisions. 
149. Stockum, supra note 148, at 833-35; Yao & Dabdoub, supra note I 19, at 28-
29. 
150. A recent example reflecting that these agencies may be influenced by 
efficiencies considerations is the FTC's Honickman opinion. See Harold A. Honickman, 
[1987-93 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'II 23,286 (Nov. 16, 1992) (FTC 
denied Honickman's request to acquire certain Seven-Up franchises in New York because 
the claimed efficiencies did not outweigh the significant anticompetitive risks, but 
granted approval for the acquisition of various New Jersey County franchises because 
the competitive risks were smaller than those identified in New York, and there was 
also "a greater likelihood of net efficiencies in New Jersey"). 
I 51. The National Association of Attorneys General Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(1993), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ,r 13,406 (March 30, 1993) [hereinafter 
NAAG Merger Guidelines]. 
152. Id. § 5.3. The NAAG Merger Guidelines rely upon Procter & Gamble and 
Philadelphia National Bank as authority for this proposition. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. See Stockum, supra note 148, at 836. 
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In recent times there has been a crescendo of academic support for the 
emergence of an efficiencies defense in the case of horizontal mergers 
involving market power. The motivation for this support is understand-
able given the importance of efficiency to the competitive process. 
However, the development of the defense will involve a complex range 
of issues. 
While the legislative history relating to, and the judicial treatment of, 
efficiencies do not appear to preclude the emergence of the defense, 
there remains a pivotal concern about the circumstances in which the 
goals of economic efficiency and the unfair transfer of consumers' wealth 
are in conflict. There is no clear answer to how this issue may be 
resolved. The legislative history suggests that greater weight should 
attach to wealth transfer concerns. Further, even taking into account the 
dynamic potential of the legislation, it is difficult to envision that an 
appreciable shift in attitude on this issue is likely to occur until there is 
compelling evidence that the vast majority of mergers are inherently 
efficiency-enhancing or that the emergence of the defense is critical to 
the economy. Such matters may be difficult to demonstrate, particularly 
in light of the contrary conclusions of earlier studies. 156 It may 
nonetheless be predicted with some confidence that the judicial hostility 
to efficiencies reflected in the Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s has 
subsided. The pro-competitive characteristics of efficiencies are now 
more clearly understood than they were at the time of the enactment of 
section 7 and at the time that they were considered by the Warren Court. 
It follows that the recent trend of lower courts to at least view 
efficiencies favorably is an encouraging development. However, there 
remains a quantum leap that will need to be made from this point to the 
emergence of a judge-made efficiencies defense. There does not appear 
to be an appropriate theoretical framework to balance wealth transfer and 
efficiencies considerations where they are in conflict. This is not to say 
that the defense cannot emerge. But, absent some price standard in the 
formulation of the defense, it will continue to be plagued with uncertain-
ty about the unfair transfer of consumers' wealth. 
156. See. e.g., RAVENCRAFT & SCHERER, supra note I. 
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Should a judge-made efficiencies defense emerge, it should be framed 
in absolute terms. An absolute formulation, such as that advanced by 
Pitofsky, has the following benefits. Measurement ambiguities may be 
reduced to tolerable levels and this may result in greater certainty in the 
application of the defense, with all of its attendant benefits. Further, a 
ceiling will be placed on the level of market power that may be 
achievable. Turning to the controversial elements of the defense, the 
merging firms should not be required to demonstrate that the efficiency 
gains will be passed on to consumers. Further, while there should be at 
least some requirement that the merging firms demonstrate that the 
efficiencies are not achievable by other means, this inquiry should be 
limited to the possibility of internal expansion. 
If progress in the development of the defense remains slow or does 
not eventuate, the question of enforcement discretion will become all the 
more important. The recognition of efficiencies in this way has certain 
attractions, assuming that there is confidence and reasonable certainty in 
the process. Under this approach efficiencies can be recognized in 
appropriate cases without the need to satisfy a rigorous defense. 
However, the potential for conflicting views to be taken by the federal 
antitrust agencies and the State Attorneys General is a matter of concern. 
Ultimately, pragmatism will need to prevail if the exercise of enforce-
ment discretion is to provide the solution. 
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